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Abstract 
As part of its 2012 Youth Service package, the Government has introduced compulsory income management for 
recipients of the new Youth Payment and Young Parent Payment benefits. The scheme involves dividing 
beneficiaries’ payments between automatic redirections for rent and other bills, an electronic payment card that 
can only be used for food and groceries and a cash payment of no more than $50 per week The only other 
country to operate comparable programmes is Australia which introduced income management in 2007 as part 
of the Northern Territory Emergency Response.  
This paper presents a preliminary assessment of the income management scheme introduced in the Youth 
Service package. We examine the design of, and apparent rationale for, the policy and consider some of its 
implications. We also compare the New Zealand policy with the way income management operates in Australia. 
We conclude that there is no evidence of widespread poor expenditure patterns amongst the two target groups 
that might justify the blanket application of the policy; that the design of the scheme inhibits people’s ability to 
budget optimally; and risks a number of negative and perverse outcomes. It appears that the rationale 
underlying the use of income management is to deter benefit receipt rather than to assist with financial 
management. In our view, this is not an appropriate use of the policy, especially if in doing so the scheme also 
risks negative outcomes. 
 
Introduction 
The Government’s welfare reforms being implemented in 
2012/13 include the introduction of a number of policies 
new to New Zealand’s social security system. One of 
these is compulsory income management – a system 
where welfare recipients have a proportion of their 
benefit income quarantined so it can only be spent on 
certain goods and services. Income management – or 
‘money management’ as it is called by the Ministry of 
Social Development (2012) – is being applied 
compulsorily to recipients of the new Youth Payment and 
Young Parent Payment benefits as part of the 
Government’s Youth Service package.  
The only other country to implement comparable income 
management measures is Australia, where it was 
originally introduced in 2007 as part of the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response (NTER) following the 
report of the Board of Inquiry into the Protection of 
Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse which linked 
alcohol and drug abuse in some rural Northern Territory 
communities to the abuse and neglect of Indigenous 
children (Buckmaster & Ey, 2012).  
This paper presents a preliminary assessment of the 
income management scheme introduced in the Youth 
Service package. We examine the design of, and apparent 
rationale for, the New Zealand policy and consider some 
of its implications. We also compare the New Zealand 
policy with the way income management operates in 
Australia. 
The Youth Service Package 
Youth Service is an intensive case management 
programme targeted at three groups of young people. One 
group is youth who are not on a benefit but who are 
identified as at risk of being not in employment, 
education or training and who choose to participate 
voluntarily. Because they are not on benefit, income 
management does not apply to these people and this part 
of the programme is not discussed further here. The other 
two groups are recipients of the new Youth Payment (YP) 
and Young Parent Payment (YPP). The YP is for 16-17 
year old youth and the YPP for 16-18 year old parents 
who, in both cases, are in need of income support and 
who meet certain eligibility requirements. In broad terms, 
16 and 17 year olds on either benefit must meet 
‘exceptional circumstances’ criteria relating to being 
unable to be supported by their parents or guardians or, in 
the case of young parents, have parents who are 
themselves on low incomes1. Eighteen-year-old parents, 
who up until the reforms may have been entitled to the 
Domestic Purposes Benefit, can qualify for the YPP 
without the exceptional circumstances or parental income 
tests. Young people who are or have been married or in a 
civil union or de facto relationship may also qualify. The 
programme came into force in July 2012, with a budget of 
$148.8m over four years (Minister for Social 
Development, 2012a). As at 31 October 2012 there were 
1,260 YP and 1,381 YPP recipients.  
The central objective of the Youth Services programme is 
to promote and/or maintain recipients’ engagement in 
full-time education or training leading to a NZQA Level 
Two qualification or higher. The programme is designed 
so that instead of contact with Work and Income, 
recipients are intensively case managed by contracted 
service providers (a mix of NGOs, private sector and iwi-
based organisations). Providers can receive payments of 
up to $11,250 per recipient, including payment for 
milestones and a success fee2. The programme involves 
regular planning and budgeting meetings with the 
assigned provider, placement in, and monitoring of, 
attendance at education or training, completion of a 
budgeting course and, for parents, requirements to 
complete a parenting course, and ensuring the child is 
enrolled with a health care providers. Providers are also 
responsible for referrals to specialist services where 
needed, applications to Work and Income for additional 
                                                     
1 The threshold is set at the cut-off point for the main family 
assistance measure, the Family Tax Credit. For a family with 
one child under 16, this equates to $59,000 per annum. 
2 The success fee comprises two parts: $1000 if the young 
person achieves an NCEA level or equivalent while in the 
programme and a further $1000 for each young person who 
does not apply for a main benefit (and is not incarcerated or 
deceased) within three months of exiting the programme. 
financial assistance (recipients are not permitted to apply 
on their own behalf) and for monitoring compliance, 
reporting progress or obligation failures to Work and 
Income’s Youth Service Support Unit (YSSU). 
Recipients can receive $10pw incentive payments for 
achievement of educational, budgeting and parenting 
obligations and can be sanctioned for failing to meet any 
activity obligation, including missing meetings with the 
provider3. Recipients are required, if asked, to show 
receipts and dockets to their assigned provider as 
evidence of all expenditure, including expenditure of any 
wage earnings. 
Income management in the Youth Service 
package 
Under the Youth Service income management system a 
person’s benefit, family tax credits, Accommodation 
Supplement and certain other supplementary payments 
such as Temporary Additional Support are divided three 
ways. Payments for rent, utilities and lawful debts are 
deducted from the young person’s benefit by the YSSU 
and paid directly. An “In-hand Allowance” of up to $50 
per week is paid into the recipient’s bank account.  The 
amount can be less if recommended by the service 
provider, or if less than $50 remains after redirections. 
The remainder is paid onto an electronic “Payment Card” 
which can be used to buy food and groceries at 
participating stores. The $50pw maximum for the In-hand 
Allowance is stipulated in legislation and can therefore 
only be altered by Act of Parliament. 
A person’s assigned case manager can recommend that 
they be released from income management if they have 
met certain conditions. These include having 
‘demonstrated financial competence’ for at least three 
months, having complied with all expectations and 
obligations and having earned all the incentive payments 
available to them. Complying with all obligations 
includes meeting with their provider when required and 
not having had any activity obligation failure in the 
preceding six months. A Cabinet paper on the Youth 
Service package indicated that it was intended there 
should be a “high threshold” for release from income 
management (Minister for Social Development, 2012c, 
para 24). Recipients may be returned to income 
management if they fail to meet a required obligation or if 
they demonstrate “poor financial management” such as 
“…not [using] their part-time earnings in a way that is 
appropriate for their situation (for example, bought very 
expensive clothing items when they should have saved 
for their car registration)” (Work and Income New 
Zealand, 2012, see "Returned to money management").  
Income management in Australia 
Australia is the only other jurisdiction with comparable 
income management schemes for welfare recipients. In 
the US some welfare is paid through Electronic Benefit 
Transfer (EBT) cards but these can be used in EFTPOS 
machines to withdraw cash. The Australian schemes 
                                                     
3 http://www.youthservice.govt.nz/ways-we-can-help/financial-
assistance/obligations-youth-payment.html 
began in 2007 as part of the Government’s Northern 
Territory Emergency Response (NTER) to the report of 
the Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal 
Children from Sexual Abuse, Little Children Are Sacred.. 
Although the Board of Inquiry decided not to recommend 
income management, the Government opted to introduce 
the measure in 73 predominantly Indigenous communities 
and 10 town camps and suspended the application of the 
Race Discrimination Act 1975 which the move would 
have contravened (Buckmaster & Ey, 2012). Following 
the change of Government in 2010, income management 
was amended. By moving away from blanket application 
to all beneficiaries in specified communities to a more 
targeted approach, the ‘New Income Management’ (NIM) 
measures have permitted the full reinstatement of the 
Race Discrimination Act4. There are currently five NIM 
schemes in operation, involving approximately 20,000 
recipients. The proportion of benefit income that is 
quarantined varies across the schemes but is 50 percent 
for most people. Quarantined funds can be used to pay for 
rent, utilities and food as well as for other needs. 
Recipients are free to spend the non-quarantined money 
as they choose. 
Problems with the New Zealand scheme 
The New Zealand scheme raises a number of issues. First, 
income management is applied automatically to virtually 
all new YP and YPP recipients irrespective of 
circumstances. Young people are subject to the 
constraints of the scheme even where there is no evidence 
of inability to manage their own finances or of spending 
behaviour that is harmful to them or their child5. In 
Australia, use of income management is on the basis of 
assessed individual need in three of the schemes and on 
the basis of benefit type and duration in one. Even in the 
latter case, there are provisions for exemption and the 
types of behaviours which are required of YP/YPP 
recipients in New Zealand – being in full-time education, 
ensuring children’s attendance at school, demonstrated 
ability to manage money, and so on – would be likely to 
be grounds for exemption. As at September 2012 over 
2,500 exemptions had been granted in the Northern 
Territory, and over one third of the sole parent Parenting 
Payment recipients potentially subject to income 
management have been exempted (Bray et al., 2012). 
                                                     
4 Although the majority of those subject to income 
management are still Indigenous people, for example, in 
the Northern Territory approximately 89 percent of those 
subject to NIM are Indigenous, as are 68 percent in 
Western Australia (administrative data provided by 
Department of Human Services, as at7 September 2012). 
5 The exceptions are the small number of people who 
have a partner who is over 17 years old (YP) or 18 years 
old (YPP); these people can opt out of income 
management. 
Second, and crucially, the New Zealand payment card 
covers only a subset of essential daily items. Items the 
card cannot be used for include: 
• Medical bills 
• Dental bills 
• Pharmaceuticals 
• Clothing and footwear (other than those sold at 
participating grocery stores) 
• Petrol, diesel 
• Public transport (except where transport 
cards/concession passes are sold by participating 
stores) 
• Household furniture, furnishings, (other than 
those sold at supermarkets) 
• Appliances and electric/electronic goods, even if 
sold at a participating store 
• Purchase, and maintenance of motor vehicles 
and bicycles, including registration or warrant of 
fitness of motor vehicles  
• Childcare costs, outside of that covered by the 
childcare subsidy 
• Toys, books not available at participating stores 
• Recreational activities 
In Australia the BasicsCard can be used at a wide variety 
of retailers and the definition of ‘priority needs’ covers 
nearly all basic items, including vehicle purchases and 
repairs and occasional expenses such as funerals. 
The practical effect of the design of the New Zealand 
scheme is illustrated in Table 1 which shows hypothetical 
budgets for YPP and YP recipients. The budgets assume a 
low-end rent for a private sector two-bedroom and one-
bedroom flat respectively in Accommodation Supplement 
Area Two (ie, the main cities, other than Central 
Auckland and Auckland’s North Shore)6. Table 1 
highlights the impact on YPP recipients in particular. 
After deductions for rent and utilities, the young parent 
has about $170pw quarantined on the Card to spend on 
food and groceries but only $50pw to spend on all their 
and their child’s other needs. The YP recipient, whose 
benefit income is lower, has the $50 In-hand Allowance 
but only another $20pw on the payment card7. 
 
                                                     
6 Rents are assumed to be 20 percent below the lower 
quartile private sector flat (not house) using June 2011 
rental data. In fact the figures are not very sensitive to the 
rent assumption because of the 70% Accommodation 
Supplement subsidy which means, for example, that even 
a $50pw reduction in rent would only raise after-housing-
cost income by $15pw. 
7 The In-hand Allowance proportion may be reduced if 
the assigned provider recommends this. 
Table 1: Illustrative examples of YP and YPP budgets under Income Management 
 
Youth 
Payment 
Young Parent 
Payment  
(one child) 
Income (dollars per week) 
Core benefit $170.80 $293.58 
Accommodation Supplement $70.70 $88.90 
Family Tax Credit - $92.73 
Total $241.50 $475.21 
   
Distributed between:   
Direct deduction: rent* $152.00 $224.00 
Direct deduction: power and 
water 
$20.00 $30.00 
In-hand Allowance $50.00 $50.00 
Payment Card $19.50 $171.21 
* See footnote 5. 
 
The sole parent example highlights the problem created 
by restricting the payment card to food and groceries sold 
at a narrow range of stores. The policy divides the income 
they need for essentials into two pots and constrains their 
ability to transfer funds between those pots. It is not 
possible to economise on food and groceries in order to 
meet other costs such as transport, clothing or footwear. 
Nor is it possible to defer or reduce household grocery 
spending to meet a one-off bill such as for a dentist or 
doctor or to cope with an unexpected or emergency cost 
such as a taxi to take a sick child to a medical centre. 
Even within the food and grocery category, the scheme 
prevents people from making best use of their money 
because of the limited number of shops where the card 
can be used. In Porirua City, for example, the card is 
accepted at the three main supermarkets, one clearance 
grocery store and two butcheries. It cannot be used at 
other low-cost Porirua retailers including The Warehouse, 
K-Mart, Dress-smart, Nappies-for-Less and the $2-Shop. 
Similarly, the card cannot be used at weekend markets 
where fruit, vegetables and other food are often cheaper. 
The New Zealand Herald quoted one young mother 
pointing out that, while she can buy nappies at the 
supermarket, they were much cheaper at another, non-
participating store (Collins, 2012). The Minister herself 
has been reported referring to cases where people are 
apparently on-selling goods bought at the supermarket in 
order to increase the cash available to them for other 
purchases: “’'I can't stop individual practice really, we 
have some bizarre things that happen; you know people 
buy 10 cooked chickens and then go and sell them in the 
car park.’  Batteries were the most purchased item on the 
cards because they were easily on-sold, while food was 
being swapped for cash, she said” (Chapman, 2012). Far 
from being ‘bizarre’, this seems a rational response to the 
policy. 
A third issue with the income management component of 
the scheme is that it clashes with the service providers’ 
role. Government has invested heavily in the intensive 
case management services, with an estimated $137 
million of the total budget to be allocated to funding the 
service providers. Yet, two conflicting forms of income 
management are effectively being superimposed on each 
other – the electronic money management scheme on top 
of the case managers’ budget oversight role. Providers are 
required to have detailed budgeting discussions with their 
clients but, at times, their best advice will be constrained 
by the income management rules. There is, for example, 
no way a provider can assist a client to have more money 
for non-grocery items by helping them find cheaper 
accommodation or by advising on how to save on 
electricity. Less efficient still is the situation where the 
provider agrees that their client needs additional cash in 
hand to buy a specific item. Even if the beneficiary has 
spare funds on the Payment Card, the only way these can 
be accessed is for the provider to apply on the recipient’s 
behalf for a recoverable benefit advance which, if 
accepted by the YSSU, is then repaid in instalments from 
the payment card allocation. Moreover, it is possible that 
applications for benefit advances could be seen as 
evidence of ‘poor budgeting’ and therefore a reason not to 
release a person from income management. Income 
management payment cards are essentially a ‘hands-off’ 
technological mechanism to restrict some expenditure to 
essential items. They are inconsistent with the very 
hands-on close budgetary supervision that is part of the 
service provider’s role. 
  
The Government’s rationale for the Youth 
Services money management policy: 
Assistance or deterrence? 
The Government has not set out any explicit rationale for 
including income management as part of the Youth 
Service package. The Social Security (Youth Support and 
Work Focus) Amendment Act 2012 contains only a 
general purpose statement relating to the Youth Service 
package as a whole by including a sub-section to the 
purposes of the Act stating: 
to provide services to encourage and help young 
persons to move to education, training, and 
employment rather than to receiving financial 
support under this Act. 8 
Social Security Act 1964 s1A(ca) 
Furthermore, as noted above, Government has also not 
provided evidence of widespread mismanagement of 
money among the two targeted groups which could 
potentially be used as a justification for the blanket 
imposition of income management. The Regulatory 
Impact Statements accompanying the legislation state 
only that9: 
Managing money, particularly for those on low 
incomes, can at times be difficult and can result in 
debt or lack of essential items. Direct payment of 
benefit to third parties could have positive 
benefits, assisting young people to manage their 
finances better. Coupled with budget training, this 
could prevent these young people accumulating 
debt or being evicted because of rent arrears. 
These positive outcomes justify the different 
treatment of these young people. 
(Ministry of Social Development, n.d. para 38) 
Even if there were strong evidence that money 
management problems were common, it would be more 
logical to use the assigned service providers’ budgetary 
oversight role as the default, reserving income 
management for individual cases where this proved 
ineffective. 
In the absence of evidence that the rationale for the policy 
is to help young people who have budgeting problems, it 
appears that one of the Government’s primary 
motivations for including income management in the 
Youth Package is to deter benefit receipt. Official and 
                                                     
8 In contrast, the Australian Social Security 
(Administration) Act 1999 lists six purposes for income 
management, all of which relate to the wellbeing of the 
individual affected and his or her family (Australian 
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 S123TB, cited 
in (Bray et al., 2012).  
9 Five paragraphs of the publicly-released version of the 
Regulatory Impact Statement have been withheld under 
the Official Information Act 1982 (for unspecified 
reasons) but judging from their position in the document 
it does not appear these paragraphs relate to the rationale 
for income management. 
Ministerial statements reinforce this view. The Youth 
Package Cabinet paper states that the Youth Package will: 
discourage an early reliance on benefit receipt by 
replacing benefits with a new form of financial 
support, distributed through redirections, 
payments and a small cash allowance. 
(Minister for Social Development, 2011, para 4) 
The Minister made this objective clear in her First 
Reading speech when the Bill was introduced:  
I will be frank: we want to make welfare a less 
attractive proposition for many young people. We 
will not continue to dish out money to young 
people and teen parents and just hope that they 
will be OK. Instead, with the youth payment for 
16- and 17-year-olds, and the young parent 
payment for 16-, 17- and 18-year-old teen parents, 
we will help them manage their money into their 
being less dependent. 
(Minister for Social Development, 2012b) 
There are several problems with this. First, in respect of 
Youth Payment applicants there is little need for a 
disincentive. Most YP applicants, unless their parents or 
guardians are absent or deceased or the applicant is 
transitioning out of State care, cannot be granted the 
benefit without first going through a Family Breakdown 
Assessment designed to test whether in fact they are able 
to be supported by family. In respect of the YPP, once 
they become parents, these are young people who are in 
need of income support while they continue in education. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the income 
management provisions of the Youth Package will reduce 
the rate of teen pregnancies, increasing the likelihood that 
pregnant teenage women will choose to terminate their 
pregnancies or reduce the rate of sole parenthood among 
teen mothers.  
Another possibility is that making ‘welfare a less 
attractive proposition’ is intended to encourage young 
people to exit the YP or YPP benefits by taking 
employment. If so, this conflicts directly with the explicit 
– and commendable – objective of the package to 
maintain young people in full-time education or training. 
A second problem with the use of income management as 
a disincentive is that to achieve that objective it must 
materially interfere with how the person would prefer to 
spend their income. In the context of New Zealand levels 
of benefit payments relative to living costs, a $50 In-hand 
Allowance purely for personal discretionary spending 
would be unlikely to be a significant disincentive. The 
great majority of young beneficiaries would be pleased to 
have that much discretionary income. Any disincentive 
impact can only be engineered by requiring that the In-
hand Allowance also cover a wide range of basic living 
expenses. As discussed earlier, it is this aspect of the 
package that risks causing a number of negative, 
undesirable effects, particularly for teen parents and their 
children.  
It is possible that the disincentive effect is intended to 
operate simply through perceptions – the idea being to 
“reframe” the benefit so that potential applicants perceive 
that they will have only a “small cash allowance” without 
actually denying them the income needed to get by. We 
are not aware of any evidence that young people would 
be influenced by a misunderstanding of this sort and 
certainly none has been provided by Government. 
Moreover, it would seem unlikely that such an effect 
would be significant in comparison to the other changes 
such as the requirements, which did not exist with the 
previous benefits, to be in full-time education or training 
and to engage in a programme of intensive case 
management. More fundamentally, if the objective is 
simply reframing, the policy should be designed in a way 
that ensures it does not interfere with good budgeting and 
the living standards of those who are subject to income 
management. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a preliminary 
critical examination of the income management 
component of the Youth Services package and to 
compare its design with comparable schemes operating in 
Australia. Compulsory income management is a new 
development in New Zealand’s social security system, 
one that is rare internationally. For these reasons, and its 
inherently intrusive nature, it warrants close attention and 
will need rigorous, arms-length evaluation.  
The policy as implemented raises a number of concerns. 
First, there is no evidence of widespread poor expenditure 
patterns amongst the two target groups sufficient to 
warrant the blanket application of the policy. Second, and 
unlike in Australia, the fact that a wide range of ordinary 
necessary expenses cannot be bought with the 
quarantined component of the benefit and must be funded 
from the $50 In-hand Allowance actually reduces 
people’s ability to budget optimally and risks a number of 
negative and perverse outcomes. Third, in light of the role 
given to service providers to oversee recipients’ 
budgeting and spending, there is no budgeting-related 
reason to also impose compulsory money management. 
Fourth, from official and Ministerial statements it appears 
that one motivation for the money management policy is 
to deter benefit receipt. This, in our view, is not an 
appropriate use of compulsory income management, 
especially if the design of the scheme also risks negative 
outcomes.  
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